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I~ ~fHE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
s·r,\TE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 9998.

FR.\~K JERR\~

OWENS,
Defendant and Appellant.

I3RIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
The appellant appeals from a conviction for the crime
of forgery in violation of 76-26-1, U.C.A. 1953, upon jury
trial in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County,
lTtah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On July 9, 1963, the appellant was tried and convicted
of forgery, in violation of 76-26-1, U.C.A. 1953, by uttering and passing a forged money order. The case was tried
by a jury which returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial
court committed the appellant to the State Prison for the
indeterminate period provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The respondent submits that the trial court's judgment
should be affirmed.
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2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent will accept the appellant's statement
of facts, except to the extent that they may appear differently or be added to in the argument portion of this brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY EVIDENCE
TENDING TO SHOW ANY ASSOCIATION OF THE DEFENDANT WITH Al\TY OTHER CRIMINALS; FURTHER,
APPELLANT HAS NO BASIS TO CLAIM ANY ERROR RELATING TO THE IDENTITY OF THE APPELLANT BY
WITNESSES FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

The appellant contends in Point I of his brief that the
jury had before it evidence of the accused's association with
other known criminals. No testimony of any kind was received by the jury which in any way indicated that the
appellant associated with criminals prior to or during the
time of the commission of the offense. Consequently, the
appellant's assertion is not quite correct.
A reading of the appellant's brief results in the conclusion that the appellant is in fact complaining that the
trial jury received evidence of a pre-trial identification of
the appellant as the person who uttered Exhibit A, the
forged money order. The identification of the appellant
as the culprit was made by Kenneth Bramwell, the operator
of Bramwell's Market in Ogden, Utah, from "mug" photographs of the appellant and other persons (R. 11). The
photographs were presented to Mr. Bramwell by Officer
Warner Bruestle of the Ogden City Police Department
prior to trial, in an effort to have Mr. Bramwell identify
the person who gave him the forged money order (R. 38).
Mr. Bramwell identified the appellant from the photo-
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3
~raphs presented ( R. 11 ) and the trial court heard the
trstirnonv of ~lr. Bram\vt:ll to the effect that he made a
prt'vious, identification of the appellant from the photo-

graphs (R. 1L 38).
Subsequently, Mr. Bramwell was cross-examined intensivclv bv defense counsel concerning the identification of
the ~~pp~llant as being the individual responsible for passing the forged money order.
At the time of opening statements, counsel for the appellant indicated that he would rely for a defense on the
contention that the appellant was not the individual who
had cotnmitted the crime, and had been improperly identified by the victims. Defense counsel endeavored to show
that the prior identification of the appellant as the culprit
by ~Ir. Bramwell from the photographs given him by the
Ogden Police, was a confused and inaccurate identification.
Xo objection at anytime was raised by the appellant to the
use of the photographs nor to their admission ( R. 40) .
It is submitted that whatever claim of error the appellant might have had to the use of the photographs at trial
has not been preserved on appeal since the appellant took
no objection. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed.,
Sec. 348, notes:
"It is a general rule that, in order to take advantage of the admission of evidence by the trial court as error and to secure a reversal
of its judgment upon appeal, the evidence must be objected to in
the trial court. Likewise where no objection is made to crosse."<amin~tion. neither the propriety thereof, nor the competency of
the testlmony brought out thereby may be questioned on appeal."

The appellant failed to make any objection to the receipt of any evidence relating to his identification from the
mug shots, nor "·as any objection raised to receiving the
pictures in evidence to allow the jury to see the nature of
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the identification. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, Sec.
350, notes:
"The proper time to object to the introduction of evidence is when
it .becomes ~pp~rent that .er:or will be commit~ed by receiving
evidence which 1s not admissible, as when the evidence is offered
***"

Section 351 also notes:
"Any objection to the admissibility of evidence is waived by failure
to object thereto. If defendant fails to object to evidence when
first offered, he waives its incompetency. * * * "

Further, it should be noted that no effort was ever made by
the appellant to have the evidence stricken or to have the
jury instructed as to its limited use. As a consequence, it is
submitted that since the appellant made no effort to void
the error he now seeks to take advantage of on appeal, he
may not, therefore, claim prejudice.
Secondly, it is submitted that the receipt of the evidence
was proper. Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1130, notes:
"Ordinarily, when a witness is asked to identify the assailant, or
thief, or other person who is the subject of his testimony, the witness' act of pointing out the accused (or other person) then and
there in the court-room, is of little testimonial force. After all that
has intervened, it would seldom happen that the witness would
not have come to believe in the person's identity. The failure to
recognize would tell for the accused; but the affirmative recognition might mean little against him.
The psychology of the situation is practically the s~e as when
Recent Contrivance is alleged. To corroborate the Witness, therefore, it is entirely proper (on the principle of § 1129, ante) to
prove that at a former time, when
suggesti.o~s o.f others .coul~
not have intervened to create a fancied recognition m the Witness
mind, he recognized and declared the present accused to be the
person.***''

t?e

Although it must be admitted that there are jurisdictions which have ruled to the contrary, it would appear
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that the majority of courts have allowed the use of such evi-

dence. In 22A, C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 725, p. 1011, it
j, stated:
uother decisions however' broadly hold that evidence of extrajudicial identifi~ation is admissi~le, as an exception to t~e .hear~ay
r·ulr and that a witness may testtfy as to another person s tdentrfic.lti~n of a person, thing, or place. So, it has been held that testimony as to the mere fact that another person identified, describe.d,
or pointed out something is not inadmissible as hearsay; and a wttnt·ss may testify to another's description of a person or place for
the mere purpose of explaining action taken in connection therewith. Also, a witness may testify to a statement made to a person
resulting in his failure to make an identification."

In People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal. 2d 555, 191 P.2d 1
( 1948) , the California Supreme Court had occasion to
consider whether or not evidence of a previous identification of the accused as the culprit could be received in evidence to bolster a subsequent identification at trial. Mr.
Justice Traynor commented:
"Defendant contends that the admission of evidence pertaining to
certain nonjudicial identification of defendant was erroneous.
The prosecutrix testified that she identified defendant in a police
lineup, and a police officer testified that he was present when the
prosecutrix made the identification. Here again, defendant made
no objection to the introduction of the testimony of which he now
complains, but even if he had this evidence of previous non judicial
identification would have been admissible.
'~narily \vhen a witness is asked to identify the assailant, or

thtet, or other person who is the subject of his testimony, the witness' act of pointing out the accused (or other person), then and
there in the courtroom, is of little testimonial force. After all that
has intervened, it would seldom happen that the witness would
not ha~·e come to believe in the person's identity. The failure to
~ogn_tze would t.ell for t?e accused; but the affirmative recognition nught mean httle agatnst him.
The psychology of the situation is practically the same as when
~ecent Contrivance is alleged. To corroborate the witness, theretore, it is entirely proper* * *to prove that at a former time when
the suggestions of others could not have intervened to c;eate a
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fancied recognition in the witness' mind, he recognized and declared the present accused to be the person. If, moreover (as
sometimes is done) the person \\·as then so placed among others
that all probability of suggestion (by seeing him hand-cuffed for
example) is still further removed, the evidence becomes stro~ger.
The typical illustration is that of the identification of an accused
person at the time of arrest. * * *' IV Wigmore on Evidence,
3d Ed., p. 208.
The foregoing rule stated by Wigmore is not accepted in all jurisdictions, but the weight of recent authority is in accord with his
views. * * * "

In a case very similar to the instant one, People v. Ford,
345 P.2d 573 (Cal. 1959), a protest was made that the jury
was allowed to receive evidence of a previous identification
of the accused by a witness from "mug" shots. The court
commented on this objection and found it unmeritorious,
stating:
"Authorities bearing directly on this point involve for the most part
identification prior to court appearance by way of police show-up
or of his person at a place other than the police station. Appellant's
real objection seems to be the manner in which the prior identification was proved, by the introduction into evidence of the 'mug'
photograph, which he claims imputed to him a prior criminal
record. Generally, if evidence be material and relevant to an issue
in a criminal trial, even though it tends to be prejudicial, it is
nevertheless admissible when its probative value outweighs the
possible prejudicial effect (People v. Cheary, 48 Cal. 2d 301, 3?9
P.2d 431) ; and a determination thereof lies within the sound discretion of the trial court * * *."

In People v. Aquirre, 332 P.2d 4 78 (Cal. 1958), the
court, citing the Slobodian case, supra, affirmed the use of
prior identification from pictures and a lineup.
Most recently, in People v. Gould, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354
P.2d 865 ( 1960), the California Supreme Court again considered the question of the admissibility of an extrajudicial
identification of the accused by a witness. The identifica-
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tion by the witness \vas made from a photograph. Mr. Justice 'fraynor, again speaking for the court, stated:
"Evidence of an extra-judicial identification is admissible, not only
to corroborate an identification made at the trial (People v. Slobodion, 11 Cal. 2d 555, 560, 191 P.2d 1), but as independent evidence of identity. Unlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent statements unless it is first impeached (People v. Hardenbrook, 48 Cal. 2d 345, 351, 309 P.2d
·~24: People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 753-754, 104 P.2d 794),
rvidence of an extra-judicial identification is admitted regardless
of whether the testin1onial identification is impeached, because
the earlier identification has greater probative value than an
identification n1ade in the courtroom after the suggestions of
others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to
create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal. 2d 555, 559-560, 191 P.2d 1; United States v. Forzano, 2 Cir., 190 F .2d 687, 689; see People v. Hood, 140 Cal. App.
2d 585, 588, 295 P.2d 525; People v. Bennett, 119 Cal. App. 2d
22-l-, 226, 259 P.2d -t-76; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940)
§ 1130, p. 208. The failure of the witness to repeat the extrajudicial identification in court does not destroy its probative value,
for such failure may be explained by loss of memory or other circumstances. The extra-judicial identification tends to connect the
defendant with the crime, and the principal danger of admitting
hearsay evidence is not present since the witness is available at the
trial for cross-examination. See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174175.146 :\.2d 29, 32-33; McCormick, Evidence§ 39, p. 74; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 192-193; 3 Wigmore, E\idence (3d ed. 1940) § 1018, pp. 687-688. See also State
v. \Vilson, 38 Wash. 2d 593, 617-618, 231 P.2d 288, 300-301;
People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 201-202, 101 N.E.2d 457,460461."

l'umerous other decisions appear to have followed these
cases. judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29; Basoff v.
State, 208 Md. 643, 119 A.2d 917; State v. McSloy, 127
~font. 265, 261 P.2d 663; State v. Moon, 20 Ida. 202, 117
Pac. i57; State l'. lt"'ilson, 38 Wash. 2d 593, 231 P.2d 288;
Jrilliams l'. State, 3 72 P.2d 462 (Nev. 1962).
It should be noted that the objection raised by the appellant for the first time on appeal is not accurately directed
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to this point. Consequently, since numerous decisions from
other courts have allowed the introduction of such evidence, it can hardly be said that a basis for reversible error
exists. Further, it should be noted that the picture contained in Exhibits B, 1 through 8, by which the appellant
was identified, does not have any police identification number on the picture, nor indicate that it was taken in connection with criminal circumstances.
The appellant himself introduced into evidence Exhibit
D for the purposes of attacking the previous identification.
That photograph, introduced by the appellant, does contain attendant nomenclature connecting the appellant with
a criminal investigation. Since this was introduced by the
appellant, he is hardly in a position to claim error from
some other less prejudicial action of the prosecution.
The appellant argues that the identification of the appellant by a mug shot and the receipt of other pictures of
individuals not identified, but possibly the subject of inquiry
because of criminal activities, is raised to the level of prejudice by the fact that on cross-examination of the Ogden
City Police Officer, Mr. Bruestle, he indicated that the
accused was being investigated for other matters.
It should be noted, first, that the trial court sustained an
objection to the evidence and strictly admonished the jury
to disregard the same. This court cannot presume that the
jury did not follow the admonition. In People v. Gould,
supra, the court noted :

" * * * It must be assumed that ordinarily admonitions to the jury
are heeded. People v. Foote, 48 Cal. 2d 20, 23, 306 P.2d 803;
People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 597-598, 290 P.2d 50~;
People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 499, 197 P.2d 1. A trial co~~t s
decision that an error or impropriety can be cured by admo~1t~on
will not be reversed unless exceptional circumstances make 1t Improbable that the jury obeyed the admonition. * * * "
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See also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973; State
v.l\elsey, 283 P.2d 982 (Wash.); State v. Bolds, 55 N.W.2d
534 (Iowa).
Secondly, it should be noted that the answer was a reasonable response to a question elicited by the appellant on
cross-examination. In State v. Myers, 385 ·P.2d 609 (Utah
1963), the appellant contended that he was prejudiced by
a similar response of a police officer made to a question
asked of the officer by counsel during cross-examination.
This court refused to find prejudice, and stated:
"Inasmuch as it was his own attorney who asked the questions
which brought forth the answers on cross-examination, he is in no
position to complain of them."

There is no merit to the appellant's contention on this
point. There is no evidence of record which would tend
to indicate that the pictures used to assist in the identification of the appellant were brought to the attention of the
jury in such a way as would lead the jury to believe that
the appellant was intimately associated with persons of
questionable repute. The question of prior identification
was important to the prosecution as the issue of identification was the sole issue in the trial. Since such evidence is
normally admissible, it can hardly be said that the appellant \vas prejudiced by the receipt of the evidence where
there was no substantial indication which could lead the
jury to believe that the photographs of the other persons,
also displayed to Mr. Bramwell, were associates of the
accused. This is obvious from the fact that no objection
of any kind was made in the trial court.
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POINT II.
THE APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM ERROR BECAUSE OF
ANY FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY TO DISREGARD ANY INFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION OF THE APPELLANT WITH OTHER ALLEGED
CRIMINALS.

The appellant's contention that the trial court created
some prejudice by failing to instruct the jury to disregard
any inference of asociation of the accused with other criminals is without merit. No request for any such instruction
was made. The trial court expressly asked counsel for both
the State and the appellant whether they had any additional requests for instruction ( R. 54) . Both the State and
the appellant indicated that they had no additional requested instructions. Since the appellant requested no additional instructions, he is in no position to claim error from
the failure of the trial court to give an instruction.
In State v. RowleyJ 386 P.2d 126 (Utah 1963), this
court stated:
"*

* * No instruction was tendered by appellants in reference to

a polygraph test and no exception was taken on the failure to give
such an instruction. The general rule is that unless the party requests an instruction on a special matter, he cannot predicate
error upon the court's failure to charge. We see no reason to
deviate from this rule and so adhere in rejecting appellants' second
contention."

In State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 P.2d 727 ( 1947),
this court was presented with a claim that the trial court
committed error for failing to instruct on the limited purpose of the use of the defendant's confession. No request for
such an instruction had been made. The court noted:
"This requirement that the court instruct 'upon the law applicable
to the case' does not place upon the court alon~ the b~rden of
making up instructions which cover every question wh1ch may
have arisen in the case.
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The ~cncral rule is that unless the party requests an instruction
on a spl'rial n1atter he rannot predicate error upon the court's
failurt' to charge. * * * l'he tenor of the cases \\'e have considered,
and here cite, support our holding- that this case cannot be returned for a new trial because of the court's failure to give a
proper instruction limiting the use of l\Iiller's confession when no
such instruction was requested. * * * "

This has long been the rule of law in this jurisdiction. State
v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 158 P.2d 127; People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403; State v. Woodall, 6 U.2d 8,
J()5 P.~d 473; State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P.2d
50·~.

Additionally, where no exception was taken to failure to
instruct on the effect of such evidence, no error can be
claimed. State v. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28 P.2d 175
( 1934) ; Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec.

672.
Consequently, appellant Owens is without a meritorious
claim on this point.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the contentions of the appellant, when
,·ie,rcd against the record of the case, indicate that he has
no basis upon \\·hich to claim a new trial. The evidence of
his guilt is compelling and the appellant made no effort to
exclude the evidence now claimed to be objectionable.
The primary issue in the case \Vas the identification of the
appellant and it, therefore, became directly material to
receive the e\·idence of previous identification. The fact
that pictures of other individuals \vho may have some criminal involvement \\·ere given to the jury could hardly be
deemed prejudicial \\rhere there was no showing that these
persons were in an)'\vay associated with or connected with
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the appellant other than to provide a diversity of faces from
which to test the victim's identification of the culprit.
There is no merit to this appeal. The court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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